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Abstract 
The goal of this academic dissertation is assessing the correct value of Pirelli & SpA’s shares 
on the 31st December of 2019. Two distinct valuation methods are applied, the first being the 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) approach and the second being the relative valuation 
methodology, with the multiples used being the P/E, EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales. Then, the 
result yielded by the valuation approaches is compared to an equity research report made by 
Banca IMI. The conclusion of this dissertation is that Pirelli is marginally undervalued in the 
market, being the fair value of one unit of common stock estimated to be €5.28 at the end of 
2019, while the share is trading at €5.15 on the 29th November of 2019. Hence, the 
recommendation given in this dissertation is that investors should buy Pirelli’s shares. This 
recommendation is solely based on the DCF methodology, since the relative valuation produced 
inconsistent results across the different multiples used and when compared with the value 
computed through the DCF approach. Banca IMI estimates the value of one unit of common 
stock at the end of 2019 to be €6.10, which is a higher valuation than the one expected by this 
dissertation. As Netflix’s stock was trading at €5.41 at the time of valuation, Banca IMI also 
advises to buy Pirelli’s stock. This difference can be justified by different assumptions 
regarding the evolution of Netflix’s FCFFs and Perpetual growth, as the WACC in both 
valuations differs only 24 basis points. 
 
Keywords: Equity Valuation, Discounted Cash Flow Model, Relative Valuation 
- 
O objectivo desta dissertação académica é estimar o justo valor de acções da Pirelli & SpA no 
dia 31 de Dezembro de 2019. Para isso são utilizados dois métodos distintos, o primeiro 
chamado Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) e o segundo Relative Valuation, sendo que os múltiplos 
usados são o P/E, EV/EBITDA e EV/Sales. De seguida, é comparada a avaliação produzida por 
esta dissertação com um equity research report feito à Pirelli pelo Banca IMI. A conclusão 
gerada por esta dissertação é que a Pirelli está neste momento ligeiramente subvalorizada pelo 
mercado, sendo que o justo valor de uma acção estimado para o fim de 2019 é de €5.28, 
enquanto no dia 29 de Novembro de 2019 essa mesma acção estava cotada a 5.15€. Por isso, a 
recomendação dada nesta dissertação é que investidores devem comprar acções da Pirelli. Esta 
recomendação é exclusivamente baseada no modelo DCF, visto que a Relative Valuation 
apresenta resultados inconsistentes entre os múltiplos utilizados e também díspar do resultado 
chegado através do modelo DCF. O Banca IMI estima que o valor de uma acção no fim de 2019 
deveria ser €6.10, produzindo assim uma recomendação semelhante à desta dissertação, visto 
que à data da sua análise uma acção da Pirelli estava cotada a €5.41. A presente diferença pode 
ser justificada por diferentes pressupostos considerados no calculado de FCFF futuros e 
também Perpetual Growth, sendo que o WACC utilizado pelas duas análises apenas difere em 
24 pontos base.  
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This dissertation focus on utilizing Equity Valuation methods to provide investment advice 
about the company Pirelli & C SpA as of 31st of December of 2019. Hence, the central point 
of this dissertation is to obtain a value of the company in question and then recommend to either 
buy, sell or hold shares.  
Pirelli & C SpA was the company chosen for this dissertation as it suffered a profound 
restructuring, which even included changes to its core business. After a hiatus from the stock 
markets, Pirelli returned in the 4th of October of 2017 to the Milan stock exchange. 
Additionally, the car tyre industry has been suffering changes, due to a shift in car 
manufacturers' tyre demands and technological innovations, which can potentially help Pirelli 
gain market share over its more direct competitors in the future. 
Through the course of this dissertation, several assumptions were made based on up to date 
public information and reliable projections about the economy and industry, so that this 
valuation could reflect a future environment as close to reality as possible. Then, the second 
section of this dissertation was reserved for the explanation of the theoretical knowledge and 
methodologies used throughout this equity valuation. In the next sections of this dissertation, a 
macroeconomic and industry outlook were performed, followed by an overview of Pirelli & C 
SpA, focusing on past and future trends regarding the economy, industry, and company.  
Moving on to the valuation part of this academic dissertation, in section 6, a Discount Cash 
Flow and a Relative valuation are executed. Still, before drawing conclusions about this equity 
valuation, in section 7, results originated by this dissertation are compared to results of an equity 







2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Valuation Methods 
To be able to accurately evaluate a company is extremely important and considered by many 
as one of the most important tasks in corporate finance, "Valuation lies at the heart of much of 
what we do in Finance" (Damodoran, 2006). Considering that valuing a company is something 
done very regularly and is one of the most common tasks performed by finance professionals 
worldwide, one would assume that it is very well researched matter and that everyone would 
follow precise and flawless methodologies. However, valuation is still a very subjective matter 
that creates controversy among very prestigious experts in the area. Additionally, topics such 
as risk management, how to best estimate cash flows, and what valuation model retrieves the 
best results, are not being addressed as they should be. 
According to one of the experts in the area, Damodaran (2006), there are four existing methods 
to perform a valuation. The first is called discounted cash flow, which values an asset to the 
present value of its future cash flows. The second, relative valuation, consists in valuing an 
asset by observing the pricing of "comparable" assets relative to a common variable such as 
Cash Flows, earnings, book value or sales. The third one, contingent claim valuation, utilizes 
pricing models to assess the value of assets with similar option characteristics. Moreover, 
accounting valuation utilizes book value to determine the value of an asset. 
To this day, no method has proved to deliver an utterly accurate valuation of an asset, and each 
method has its strong points and weak points. Thus, choosing the correct methods to use, and 
which retrieve the most accurate valuation for the specific asset being valued is vital, as by 
comparing the market value of the asset to its projected value, an investor can either opt to sell, 
hold or buy the asset (Reilly and Brown, 2012). 
As there are no perfect valuation models, it is essential to choose the ones that adapt better to 
the imperfections of the information about the future. Nevertheless, considering various 





2.2. Discounted Cash-Flow Model 
“The value of an asset is not what someone perceives it to be worth, but it is a function of the 
expected cash flows on that asset” (Damodaran, 2006). 
The DCF model estimates the present value of the future Cash Flows produced by an asset, 





𝐶𝐹𝑛= Cash Flow 
𝑇𝑉𝑡= Terminal Value 
r = Discounted rate for the appropriate cash flows’ risk 
n = time periods, time = 1 to t 
 
Two key factors are considered in the formula above: expected Cash Flows and the discount 
rate. In order to determine them, one needs to make a set of assumptions. Better assumptions 
result in more accurate expected Cash Flows, leading to a more accurate valuation.  
In its essence, the DCF model presents results considering three main assumptions: "First, we 
assume a long-term constant sustainable growth, since the terminal value usually represents 
more than 75% of the firm's market value. Second, no new equity issues are expected, because 
if we assume that companies do not typically issue equity above or below fair value, this 
assumption has no impact on our valuation. Third, no change in holdings of cash or marketable 
securities, since it makes it easier to calculate the firm's value, we assume companies do not 
accumulate piles of cash" (Young et al., 1999). 
The DCF method is arguably the most used valuation method, as it is "the most accurate and 
flexible method for valuing projects, divisions, and companies." (Koller et al., 2005). However, 
it is advisable to consider other methods when performing a valuation. 
2.2.1. Free Cash-Flow to the Firm 
 
 









𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 −  ∆𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
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The FCFF formula to be applied in this dissertation was created by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), and it is the most commonly used. 
FCFF comprises the totality of all the cash generated by a company to be distributed through 
its shareholders. It is necessary to make some adjustments, as the after-tax result is distributed 
only to shareholders, and since not all the constituents of the Net Income are cash related. Thus, 
depreciations are re-added to remove their effect. Additionally, as CAPEX reveals the 
investments and divestments made by a company and bearing in mind that these are not 
considered in the Net Income, there is a need to subtract them. Finally, the variation in NWC 
is also deducted from the financial result generated by a company, as it represents the company's 




In the end, FCFFs are plugged in the formula presented in section 2.2. resulting in the present 
value of the asset. 
2.2.2. Free Cash Flow to Equity 
Starting with the FCFF formula, it is possible to reach the Cash Flow reserved to equity holders 
by subtracting the remaining sum of cash after all the needed debt repayments, and 
reinvestments are done. 
 
Using FCFE instead of FCFF might produce different results when applied in the DCF model 
since the discount rates considered are not equal. While the FCFF is discounted at the WACC, 
the FCFE is discounted at the rate of return required by equity holders. Both of these discount 
rates will be explained in the next section. 
 
2.2.3. Discount Rates 
Discount rates reflect the reward demanded by investors to bear the risk of investing in a 
particular asset. Naturally, these fluctuate with both the characteristics of the asset and the 
macroeconomic environment. 







 1 + 𝑟 𝑡
 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸 = 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 
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2.2.3.1 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
Simply, WACC is no more than the expected return a company could get by investing in other 
assets with similar risk characteristics (Luehrman, 1997). The opportunity cost faced by 
investors incorporates concepts such as time value and nominal risk-free investment, resulting 
from not investing money in risky alternatives. The kind of risk profile of the investor is also 
included in the WACC, called the risk premium, which reflects the return for the extra risk 
investors are willing to take. Additionally, by being a tax-adjusted discount rate, the WACC 
attempts to incorporate the effect of the interest tax shields (ITS). ITS results from the fiscal 
advantage associated with the level of debt of a company.  
 
The WACC formula incorporates the cost of debt, 𝑟𝑑, multiplied by the weight of debt in the 
capital structure of the company and deducted by the effect of taxes. As for the return on equity, 
re, it is weighted by the level of equity of the company on its total value.  
As stated by (Goedhart et al., 2010), the Debt and Equity values used in the WACC formula 
for mature companies, should be market values, so that they represent the true capital structure 
of the company. 
2.2.3.2 Return on Equity 
 
In theory, the return on equity, as the name suggests, represents the return demanded by equity 
holders of a particular company. According to the CAPM model, it can be calculated having in 
mind three main elements. For quite some time, the CAPM model has been the standard when 
it comes to the cost of equity calculations (Damodaran, 2002).  
The CAPM determines the risk level of a specific company considering its sensitivity to the 
stock market. It does so by taking into account the risk-free rate, 𝑟𝑓; the market risk premium, 
MRP, that represents the difference between the return of the market and the risk-free 
investment return and also the risk of a certain company compared to the average company’s 
risk, 
𝑖
. This risk measurement approach is quite unique and different from how other models 
measure risk.  
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =   
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑉 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
 × 𝑟𝑑 × (1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) +   
𝑀𝑉 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑀𝑉 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
 × 𝑟𝑒  
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 = 𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑀𝑅𝑃) 
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The CAPM model assumes certain aspects that need to be taken into consideration: the first 
one, the non-consideration for transaction costs. The second one, the principle of infinitely 
divisible investments, stating that anybody is able to buy or sell fractions of the underlying. The 
last one, no asymmetry of information, meaning that are no over or undervalued assets being 
traded in the market.  

𝑖
 is the element in the equation responsible for allowing the model to adapt to a company’s 
specific risk level, comparing the company’s market price variation with the market variation. 
So, for companies with a higher risk relative to the market, 
𝑖
 > 1, investors will demand more 
return, resulting in a higher 𝑟𝑒, which is higher than the MRP  plus the 𝑟𝑓. The opposite happens 
when the 
𝑖
 < 1. (Goedhart et al., 2010) 
2.2.3.4 Return on Debt 
The return on debt is nothing more than the return debt holders’ demand for borrowing funds 
to a particular firm. Usually, as interest payments are tax-deductible, it is calculated in an after-
tax basis. Depending on the characteristics of a company, there are different ways to compute 
𝑟𝑑 (Goedhart et al., 2010).  
If the company subject to analysis has debt being traded in the open market, the most reliable 
way to determine its cost of debt is to calculate the Yield to Maturity (YTM) of its traded bonds 
(Goedhart et al., 2010). If the company being valued does not issue public debt in a consistent 
manner, one should use its debt rating in order to achieve a more honest estimation of the YTM, 
while considering the company’s marginal tax rate so that 𝑟𝑑 maintains its after-tax nature.  
In case the company in question is considered investment-grade, implying that default is very 
unlikely to happen, to estimate the return on debt, one should consider the YTM of non-option, 
long-term bonds.  
To conclude, in case of a non-listed firm, (Damodaran, 2001) suggests that a reasonable 
estimate for the cost of debt is to compute the interest coverage ratio, which concerns to the 
recently borrowed funds.  
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2.2.4 Terminal Value 
As per (Young et al., 1999), the expected future growth of the company in perpetuity is 
represented in the Terminal Value. Usually, analysts, while performing a DCF valuation, 
choose a number of years to perform individual yearly forecasts and then calculate the terminal 
value.  
As time progresses in the performance forecasting of a company, it becomes harder to predict 
future results. Questions such as: “Can the company maintain its current growth?” or “Is it 
going to keep up with the overall growth of the economy at a sustainable pace?” are questions 
that are normally asked. (Damodaran, 2002) defends that the second option is the only one that 
companies can sustain in perpetuity.  
According to (Damodaran, 2002) it exists three distinct ways of computing the terminal value: 
The first one is to determine the potential payment by other sources for liquidated assets of a 
firm in terminal value. The second one consists in estimating terminal value by applying a 
multiple to book value, earnings or revenues. Finally, the terminal value can be calculated by, 
assuming that the FCFF will grow at a steady pace in perpetuity (Young et al., 1999). 
 
2.2.5 Limitations of the DCF Model 
The DCF firm valuation method is the most used and appraised. However, this model has some 
limitations, mainly related to the assumptions we have to assume. 
As (Damodaran, 2002) has explained, the DCF model has as its base for estimating the value 
of a company its future Cash Flows and an appropriate discount rate. If the company being 
subject to valuation has been presenting consistently positive Cash Flows, it becomes easy to 
implement the DCF model. Though, as we move away from this scenario, it becomes more 
challenging to apply the model.  
As said by the author, there is a lot of hidden information about companies that analysts need 
to make educated guesses to perform valuations, meaning that, the intrinsic value reached by a 
DCF model for an individual company might not be the intrinsic value needed to reach an 
accurate valuation.  
 
TV= 





Another common problem area in a DCF valuation is related to WACC (Luehrman, 1997). If 
the company being analyzed has a complicated capital structure, funding policy or tax position, 
it is more typical for the discount rate not to be totally accurate. The WACC is more correct if 
the firm being valued has a static and straightforward capital structure.  
On an ending note, (Fernandez, 2013) suggests that there several fallacies and mistakes that 
result from the usage of WACC. For example, determining the amount of tax shields is a crucial 
factor for calculating WACC, and the latters are directly connected to the debt policies of the 
companies. So, except when capital structures are fixed, it becomes difficult to predict the 
correct discount rate to use.  
2.3 Relative Valuation Models 
Relative Valuation Models is directly connected to the use of Multiples. Multiples can be an 
excellent tool to create a proxy to the forecasts estimated by other valuation methods. It is a 
good practice to compare other valuation models to the DCF model, as the latter is very 
dependent on key estimated factors, such as: Growth rates, discount rates and return on invested 
capital.  
As stated by (Damodaran, 2005), Relative Valuation allows determining the value of a company 
based on the value of similar companies. Naturally, it is imperative to perform a Relative 
Valuation considering companies with similar expectations for the key metrics used. A well-
executed Relative Valuation enables to examine what are the expectations for the market or 
industry the company operates. Meaning that if markets are correctly pricing company, both 
DCF and Multiples methods should retrieve the same values. If the markets are over or 
underpricing assets of a particular industry, the opposite will happen (Damodaran, 2005). 
In order to perform a precise Relative Valuation, it is essential to determine a group of 
comparable companies, generally called peer group, which is reasonable to compare the 
company being analyzed. First of all, companies composing the peer group need to be priced 
in the market. Another common practice is to consider companies operating in the same sector 
to be considered comparable, although sometimes that might not be the case. Nonetheless, by 
choosing a peer group composed of companies of the same sector, we are guaranteeing that 
risk, growth and cash flows are similar between companies, enabling to make comparisons and 
ultimately creating a more accurate valuation (Liu et al., 2002). 
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At times, performing a Relative Valuation can be tough as a sector might have a limited number 
of firms. Adding to that, as firms can have different sizes, it is needed to standardize. 
Standardization consists of converting market prices into variables that allow making 
comparisons. When considering shares, this process usually means turning market cap values 
of companies into multiples, such as earnings, book value, revenues or even specific attributes 
that are applicable to certain industries.  
After computing the most appropriate multiples, the next and final step is to make an analysis 
and compare results. Logically, different 
attributes of companies lead to different multiples.  
A vital aspect to be considered is that specific multiples value certain industries better than 
others, and so it is imperative to know which multiples should be applied to a given industry so 
that the most reliable valuation possible is performed. For example, (Damodaran, 2005) has 
concluded that in for companies with big infrastructures, such as cable and telecom, 
EV/EBITDA is the most suitable ratio. Also, (Fernandez, 2001) suggests that for investment 
banking firms, P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples are the ones that retrieve the best valuations. 
To conclude, (Koller et al., 2005) recommends that, grounded on empirical evidence, multiples 
should be reflected forecasts and not past values, and if that is not possible, they should be 
based in the latest available values, so that one-time events are not considered.  
Now, more detailed information about a number of commonly used multiples is going to be 
presented. 
2.3.1 Price to Book Ratio 
For a long time, investors have been using the Price to Book Ratio (PBR) with the belief that 
stocks being traded for a price lower than the book value of equity are undervalued and vice-
versa. (Damodaran, 2002) presents a number of reasons justifying why PBR is valuable. Firstly, 
and enabled by strict accounting regulation, it gives a consistent proxy for determining if assets 
are under or overvalued. Secondly, the number of firms with negative book values is much 
lower than the number of firms with negative results, meaning that the PBR can be more 




As with anything, the PBR has disadvantages that need to be taken into account. To start, in the 
eventuality of a company reporting numerous years of negative results, book values can become 
negative, and in those cases, PBR cannot be used. Additionally, book values can be affected by 
accounting regulation. If the accounting standards used across companies is not the same, PBR 
can turn out to be irrelevant. Also, if the companies do not report any significant tangible assets, 
such as services and technology firms, PBR is of no use.  
2.3.2 Price to Earnings Ratio 
Due to its straightforwardness, it is one of the most used valuation multiples and even 
commonly used in initial public offerings (Damodaran, 2002). Nevertheless, (Koller et al., 
2005) was able to recognize a couple of faults of this ratio. One being its dependence on the 
capital structure, as managers can increase the Price to Earnings Ratio (PER) by switching debt 
with equity. The other being that is centred on earnings and with that one-time events might be 
included.   
 
Two main disadvantages of the PER include the following: Assuming everything else is 
constant, a firm fully financed by equity will return a higher PER than a firm partially financed 
by debt (Koller et al., 2005). Plus, PER is not appropriate for companies with negative 
companies, so, seasonable companies, in some cases, should not be valued by this ratio 
(Damodaran, 2002). 
2.3.3 Enterprise Value Multiples (Enterprise Value to EBITDA) 
Stating (Koller et al., 2005), Enterprise Value Multiples (EVM) are considered to be a worthy 
alternative to other multiples as they are not affected by certain biases. He also says that it is 
exceptionally efficient if the companies being compared operate in the same sector.  
Enterprise value to EBITDA is the most used multiple in all Relative Valuations and is 





Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is the closest to the 
actual operational cash flow of the company, and such, it is less prone to the effect of changes 
in the capital structure of the company, unless those changes have an impact in the cost of 
capital. (Pinto, 2010 & Koller et al., 2005) 
As per (Fernandez, 2001), this kind of multiples have two drawbacks: They do not reflect 
variations in WC requirements and Capital Expenditures.  
2.3.4 Revenue Multiples (Price to Sales and Enterprise Value to Sales Ratios) 
The conceptual basis of this kind of multiples is the relationship between the revenue of a firm 
and its value. So, firms with lower value for revenue ratio should be priced lower in the market 
than firms with higher ratios.  
Revenue Multiples are a fine choice for investors looking to value a company as they can never 
return negative values, meaning that investors will not need to exclude companies from 
samples. Furthermore, Revenue Multiples are difficult to manipulate since they are less 
dependent on rules and regulations. Additionally, Revenue multiples are very useful when 
valuing cyclical firms, as they are not as affected by macroeconomic variations (Damodaran, 
2002).  
The disadvantages of this class of multiples include: Questionable ways firms find to report 
sales, which can cause investors to reach incorrect valuations. By looking at revenues and 
denoting high values to firms with high revenues might not be correct as other factors like costs 
and profits might not reflect the good revenue number. As a consequence, many consider other 
performance indicators like profits and cash flows as more important when valuing a firm 
(Damodaran, 2002). 
There are two possible Revenue Multiples to use, and they are the following: 
2.3.4.1 Price to Sales Ratio 
 
Price to Sales Ratio is the simpler and more popular of the two. It relates the market value of 
the equity of a firm and its sales. 
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2.3.4.2 Enterprise Value to Sales Ratio 
 
Enterprise Value to sales is considered to be more robust than the Price do Sales Ratio as it 
considers not only market value of equity but also market value of debt.  
2.4 Conclusions 
The valuation methods chosen to evaluate Pirelli are the DCF model and Multiples approach. 
It was decided to consider the DCF model as it is arguably the most used valuation method and 
is the one that provides the most quantitative and detailed analysis. The Multiples approach will 
be used as a way to have a comparison to the DCF valuation while checking it validity. At the 
same time, it will allow to compare Pirelli against its peers in terms of performance.  
 
3. Macroeconomic Outlook 
In terms of global economic growth, it is expected that it will grow by 3% in 2019 and improve 
to 3.4% in 2020. 2019 growth will be heavily impacted by the downgrades in the growth of 
China and other emerging Asian countries caused by effects of the trade tensions between the 
United States of America and China. (World Bank) 
It is projected that global economy will pick up its growth in 2020 and it is mainly due to the 
expected stabilization or recovery of stressed economies, such as Iran and Venezuela and 
emerging economies, such as Argentina and Turkey. This stabilization of individual economies 
should account for 70% of the growth forecast for 2020 relative to 2019. It is essential to 
mention that economic growth for 2020 is very dependent on trade tensions between China and 
the United States of America and Brexit. (World Bank) 
The following graphic contains economic growth forecasts, done by the International Monetary 











Also, by examining the above, we can see that there will be deceleration of the economic growth 
of developed regions, namely North America and Europe. Emerging regions are expected to be 
the ones supporting the next five years economic growth. Latin America, especially Brazil 
looking recover from its presidential election, is the region that is expected to improve 
compared to previous years. Asia and Pacific are still expected to keep growing at a steady 
pace, despite its leading player China having trouble to keep growing at its current pace of 6%. 
 
4. Tyre Manufacturing Industry Outlook 
The tyre market can be divided into two major segments, the O.E. and Replacement segments. 
The O.E. segment consists of the tyres fitted into vehicles that are brand new, leaving the 
factories of car manufacturers worldwide. The Replacement segment, as the name suggests, 
represents the tyres that are fitted in used vehicles when the O.E. tyres get worn down and need 
to be replaced.  
On the one hand, in 2018, the total number of tyre pieces composing the O.E. segment was 457 
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pieces O.E. segment, according to Pirelli’s own forecast, decreases even more to 437 million. 
This is due to the deceleration of the automotive production.  
On the other hand, the total number of pieces produced for the Replacement segment was 1133 
million, increasing 16 million pieces when compared to 2017. For 2019, contrary to the O.E. 
segment, it is projected that the number of pieces produced for the Replacement segment 
increases to 1135 million.  
Additionally, the tyre market can be further divided into more segments. Most tyre 
manufacturers segment their tyre offering into Standard tyres, for rim sizes 16 inches or lower, 
and High Value (HV) tyres, for rim sizes 17 inches or higher.  
There is a clear trend in the tyre market, the demand for HV tyres has been growing at a very 
promising pace, as car manufacturers fit bigger rim sizes in their models. As a consequence, 
since the number HV pieces being produced for the O.E. segment was 45.7% of the total 
number of tyres produced for that segment, while in 2017 that number was 42.7%, meaning 
that between 2017 and 2018 there was a 3%. For the Replacement segment, the trend is the 
same. In 2018, the number of Replacement tyres that were HV was 25.7% of the total 
Replacement segment, whereas in 2017 it was 24.2%. The 2019 forecast for the HV segment 
is that it continues to grow, while the opposite happens for the Standard tyres.  
Regarding Standard tyres, for the O.E. segment the trend is that with manufacturing fitting 
bigger rims on their vehicles, the need for this tyre type will decrease every year at a quite fast 
pace. For the Replacement sector, naturally, the trend is the same but at a slower pace, since 
there are still a considerable amount of vehicles that were bought with rim sizes below 16 inches 
that are still going to need to replace tyres from time to time. The following graphics display 
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There are six key drivers expected to influence demand for the next few years for the Tyre 
Manufacturing Industry. The first one is the penetration of premium & prestige cars, which is 
already one of today’s market drivers, but its influence is undoubtedly going to be higher in the 
future. Next, the increase in the number of homologations is also going to have an impact on 
the demand for tyres. Thirdly, there is an increasing demand for specialty tyres with the more 
specific demand from the manufacturers and the necessities of more educated car users. The 
fourth driver is the rising penetration of SUVs, which is a vehicle category that requires the use 
of bigger size rims. Next, the car evolution is also forecasted to impact the demand of the 
market, as all automotive segments, starting at the entry-level models, are being fitted with 
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bigger rims, that require bigger tyres. Finally, new car technologies are going to be, on a more 
long term approach, are going to influence what car manufacturers’ tyre demand will be.  








The graph above demonstrates how the number of vehicles prestige and premium vehicles has 
been evolving since 2014. It is clear that there is a definite increase in the demand for this kind 
of vehicles. Cars in these segments are fitted from the factory with HV tyres, meaning that for 
the future, the demand for this tyre segment will be growing as the manufacturers are producing 
more premium and prestige vehicles.  
4.2 Driver 2: Increase in the Number of Homologations 
With the recent trend of individualization in all kinds of industries, the automotive industry is 
no exception and customers are looking to differentiate themselves through the type of car they 
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The previous graphic puts in numbers what was said above. It is essential to mention that as 
manufacturers are adding each year more electric-powered vehicles to their model lines, 
increasing the number of homologations exponentially. 
Additionally, caused by the individualization trend, manufacturers are offering more wheel 
options to fit their model lines, allowing customers to choose between vast varieties of wheel 
options varying in size. As a result, tyre producers need to produce a more diverse variety of 
tyres. 
4.3 Driver 3: Growing Demand for Specialties  
Both for the O.E. segment and the Replacement segment, there is a demand for more speciality 
tyres to fit different kinds of needs and the new technology being fitted to vehicles. For 
example, manufacturers are looking for noise-cancelling tyres to fit their silent electric models 
or run-flat that increases the safety of their vehicles. As for the Replacement sector, car owners 
are looking more into personalized colour tyres, racing-oriented tyres and even collection tyres 
to fit classic models.  
4.4 Driver 4 & 5: Rising Penetration of SUVs & Car Development to Bigger Rims 
Sport Utility Vehicles, or more commonly known as SUVs, are vehicle type that increased the 




























vehicles and as a result, need bigger wheels and tyres. In 2000 it was sold around 5 million 
SUVs worldwide with a penetration of 10%, while in 2020 it is expected that the number of 
SUVs sold is 33 million with a penetration of 38%.  
Moreover, there is a clear tendency for car manufacturers to increase the wheel size of their 
cars, for either esthetical reasons and to accommodate the higher performances of modern cars. 
For example, the BMW M5 model sold between 1985 and 1987 was fitted with 15-inch rims 
while today’s BMW M5 model is fitted with 20-inch rims.  
4.5 Driver 6: New Car Technologies  
The future of the automotive industry is projected to be heavily impacted by technology. 
Technology has enabled cars to be connected to a mobile data connection, allowing tyre 
manufacturers to allow car users to assess tyre conditions, such as load and wear. Next, with 
the increasing penetration of electric-powered cars, tyre makers are developing tyres that 
eliminate rolling noise and accommodate the immediate torque delivered by high powered 
electric motors. Another trend of the car industry enabled by technology is the ability to share 
cars, considering this tendency tyre producers are developing cloud base solutions for fleets.  
Finally, the technology that is set to influence the most the automotive industry is the 
autonomous driving, accounting for this tyre manufacturers are studying ways to provide ways 
for cars to have real-time tyre information in order to improve safety.  
 
5. Company Overview  
Pirelli & C SpA has its headquarters in Milan, Italy, in the same place it was created in 1872 by 
Giovanni Battista Pirelli. Pirelli is a global player focused on the consumer tire market, 
producing and selling tyres for cars, motorcycles and bicycles. For a long time, Pirelli’s 
business could be divided into two main segments: Tyres for consumer cars and motorcycles 
and tyres for industrial vehicles, such as buses, heavy trucks and agricultural machinery. 
Nevertheless, since 2017 after a reorganization of the company it decided to drop the industrial 
segment. Pirelli was able to establish many partnerships with renowned carmakers such as 
Bentley, Aston Martin and Porsche, among others. The consumer tyre segment is the 




In 1901, Pirelli started producing car tyres and was able to grow at a fast pace due to rapid 
development of processes and products and also by establishing a significant presence in car 
racing associate with a substantial geographic expansion.  
By 1922, Pirelli was able to be listed in the Milan Stock Exchange, and still in the 1920s was 
able to be a listed company in the New York Stock Exchange. 1929 was the year of Pirelli’s 
outside of Europe expansion, with the inauguration of its first Brazilian plant.´ 
After the First World War until the 1960s, Pirelli continued growing its operation by building 
new plants in emerging economies of the time and by also being pioneers in tyre technology. 
During 1963, Pirelli made its first major acquisition, by acquiring a Germany based tyre maker, 
called Veith Gummiwerke AG.  
During the eighties, Pirelli consolidated its international expansion by opening two additional 
Brazilian Plants, establishing Brazil as a critical country for Pirelli´s operations, where a large 
number of Pirelli´s tyres were manufactured.  Also, in 1986, in order to reinforce its presence 
in the motorcycle tyre segment, Pirelli acquired another Germany tyre maker, called Metzeler 
Kaotscuck AG. With the goal of entering the North American market, in 1988, Pirelli acquired 
Armstrong Tyre Company, in what was the first of many movements to enter that market.  
Following a market recession and a failed acquisition of Continental AG, where many funds 
were wasted, in the early nineties, Pirelli had to go through a severe corporate and financial 
reorganization.  
The 2000s were times of consolidation and reorganization of Pirelli’s business. In 2001, Pirelli 
acquired a share in Telecom Italia SpA and became the reference shareholder until 2007. 
In 2005 Pirelli made a massive leap into the Asian market by opening its first Chinese plant.  
Moving on the 2010s, in 2010 Pirelli finalized its conversion into a “pure tyre company” by 
dismissing Pirelli BroadBans Solutions and a spin-off of Pirelli & C. Real Estate. Still, in 2010, 
Pirelli returns to Formula 1, and in 2011 it becomes the exclusive supplier of the series.  
In the spring of 2017, following a reorganization process, there was a transfer of Pirelli’s 
Industrial Tyre business to shareholder Marco Polo. On October 4, 2017, Pirelli returned to the 
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stock market, enriched with the creation of new departments and businesses, such as Consumer 
Marketing, Digital, Data Science, Cyber and Velo.  








As displayed in the graphic above, Marco Polo International Italy Sri is the largest shareholder 
of the company detaining 46% of Pirelli & C SpA. The free-float part of the shareholder 
structure is 38% of the overall equity. Additionally, the majority of the institutional investors 
are distributed through Europe, the U.K. and North America. 
5.2 Business Summary  
In order to better understand the revenues forecast to be presented in section 6, an overview of 
Pirelli´s strategic progression in terms of product categories, geographical focus and 







































In 2018, sales were 5,194 million euros, a slight decrease when compared to 2017. Still, both 
EBITDA and Net Income increase substantially compared to 2017, being around 1,247 and 432 
million euros, respectively. In summary, Pirelli was able to meet its goals for the year 2018 and 






In terms of Revenues in 2018, it is important to mention that Europe, North America, Asia 
Pacific (APAC) and Russia and CIS gained weight in the total revenue generation at the expense 
of a severe reduction of the South America region that went from being responsible for 
generating 17.1% of sales in 2017 to just 13.3% in 2018. Also, Middle East/Africa/India region 
decreased its contribution slightly, from 4.7% in 2017 to 4% in 2018. Both these regions’ 
demand for tyres is mostly composed of tyres for smaller rim sizes, so it is natural that sales 
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In 2018, Pirelli was able to strengthen its High-Value segment, increasing its weight in the total 
revenues to 63.7%, increasing from 57.5% in 2017. HV recorded a growth of 11% due to a gain 
in market share in the New Car Premium segment. Furthermore, Pirelli sales volume for car 
tyres larger than 17 inches grew 14.3% compared to the 10.0% of the market in that segment. 
In terms of EBITDA generation, the HV segment was responsible for 83% of it in 2018. 
In the Standard segment, there was a reduction of exposure on with a -14.0% contraction in 
volumes caused by the progressive exit from products with a lower rim diameter and lower 
profitability, in context of the general slowdown of the Standard market. Regarding EBITDA 
generation, the Standard segment was responsible for 17% of that.  
It is still important to mention that most of the analysis is focused on car-oriented tyres, since 
around 93% of the revenues come from this segment, while the remaining 7% comes from the 
motorcycle segment.  
Moreover, it is still possible to divide revenues between the O.E. segment and the Replacement 
segment. In 2018, the O.E. segment was responsible for 25%, and the remaining 75% was 
generated by the Replacement segment.  
Finally, regarding production capacity, Pirelli had in 2018 19 plants distributed through 12 
different countries. Plus, in 2018, 79% of the production was done in low-cost countries, while 
















Supported on sections 4 and 5 where it was provided a macroeconomic outlook as well as an 
overview of Pirelli, this section will have into account a set of assumptions for the forecast 
periods allied to historical financial information. Additionally, all methodologies used to reach 
the value of Pirelli and consequently, its share price will be fully clarified in this section. To 
end this section, a sensitivity analysis will be performed so that the uncertain nature of certain 
assumptions can be considered.  
As it was described in section 5, in 2017 re-entered the stock markets following a period of 
restructuring of the company. That will not have any detrimental impact on this valuation, as 
the company was already operating in a similar way to what it is today in the historical period 
chosen, which is between 2016 and 2018. According to the company’s strategy of continuous 
investment and growth, cash flow projections will be made until 2024, entering in a stable 
growth from 2025 onwards.  
Concluding, a forecast period of 6 years will be covered, with 2019 being based on Pirelli’s 
own estimations for that year, and the following based forecasts for the company based on a set 
of assumptions until the company reaches its stable state.  
6.1. Forecast Assumptions – Income Statement & Balance Sheet  
 
6.1.1. Revenue Forecast  
Revenue is the first item of any income statement and is unarguably the most crucial element 
of any forecast. Two methods are typically used when estimating future sales: (1) Applying an 
aggregate growth rate or (2) Sum of parts to reach a growth rate (segment level approach).  
The growth rate assumed for the future sales of Pirelli will be determined based on the second 
method presented. Tire sales have no specific trends, meaning that sales are distributed evenly 
throughout the year. The following projections will have into account information given in 
sections 3 through 5.  
6.1.1.1. Product & Mix 
As explained in section 4, tires are divided into segments according to their size, belonging 
either to the HV segment or the Standard Segment. Moreover, they can be segmented between 
Replacement and O.E. tires. Regarding the segmentation between Replacement and O.E., the 
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percentage of number of tyres sold by Pirelli to each segment (75% and 25% respectively) has 
been constant over time, and so I will assume that that trend continues in the future, as most of 
the possible car manufacture tyre supply contracts that Pirelli could have made were made 
already. Therefore, this will not impact the valuation. As for the segmentation between HV and 
Standard tyres, we know that the number of HV tyres being sold has been increasing while the 
number of Standard tyres being sold has been decreasing. Also, HV tyres were responsible for 
around 60% of the Revenues of Pirelli in 2018, which combined to the increase in the global 
demand for HV tyres would cause Pirelli’s sales to increase. However, the decrease in the 
Standard tyre Revenue has been offsetting the gains from the higher HV sales volume. As a 
consequence, the overall number of tyres sold by Pirelli has decreased from 2017 to 2018 and 
considering Pirelli’s estimates for 2019, there will be a decrease for that year too. To estimate 
the remaining years of the projection period, it was used the expected growth in the overall car 
parc as, according to Pirelli in its 2019 Outlook presentation, there is a correlation between that  
number and the demand for tyres. Again, as stated in the 2019 Outlook presentation, from 2016 
to 2019, the CAGR of the total car parc is 4% while the projected CAGR for the 2019 to 2022 
period decreases to 3%. Additionally, from 2016 to 2019, the CAGR of the prestige and 
premium segments car parc is 6% while the projected CAGR of those segments for the 2019 
to 2022 period decreases to 5%.  
It is already confirmed by Pirelli, in its 2019 Outlook, that HV volumes increase 7.5% and 
Standard volumes decrease 10.5%. The remaining years were projected considering the 
decrease in the number of cars, and consequently, the demand for tyres, assuming that the 
increase in HV tyre units sold will decrease at constant rate until it reaches 6.5% in 2022, 1% 
down from 2019 Pirelli’s own projections, to accommodate the 1% decrease in the prestige & 
premium car parc CAGR. Regarding Standard tyre units, the same methodology applied to the 
HV was implemented, since the overall car parc CAGR also decreases by 1% until 2022. For 








6.1.1.2. Price & Mix  
Price & Mix has been the biggest driver of the growth in revenue for the last few years, and in 
the future, it is expected to continue to be moving forward. Pirelli was able to vastly improve 
its Price & Mix with increases of over in each year, and this was crucial for Pirelli to manage 
their results and offset eventual losses due to foreign exchange. Pirelli was able to improve its 
Price & Mix mainly due to the growing share of the High-Value segment and by the increase 
in prices in emerging markets to counter exchange rates’ volatility.  
What was said on section 6.1.1.1. regarding the evolution of units sold in each segment being 
correlated with the decrease in car parc, also has an implication to this Revenue driver. In this 
case, the effect of the projected decreasing CAGR should impact less this driver, since it is also 
impacted by inflation. As a consequence, it was assumed, similarly to what was assumed for 
the Product & Mix driver, that until 2022 Price & Mix gains should decrease from the confirmed 
for 2019 by Pirelli 4,5% to 4%. From 2022 onwards, as there is no information available for 
that period, it will be assumed that the Price & Mix driver remains constant at 4%.  
Concluding, the second main revenue driver for the future is the fact that Pirelli has been 
successful in improving its average price. This is possible has the average price of an HV tyre 
is superior to the average Standard tyre price. Adding to that, Pirelli has been efficient in 






2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Standard 32.7 37.0 31.8 28.5 25.4 22.6 20.0 17.7 15.6
growth (%) 13.1% -14.0% -10.5% -10.8% -11.2% -11.5% -11.5% -11.5%
HV 20.9 24.2 27.6 29.6 31.8 33.9 36.2 38.5 41.0
growth (%) 15.4% 14.1% 7.5% 7.2% 6.8% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5%
Total 53.63 61.15 59.38 58.12 57.16 56.49 56.13 56.18 56.65
growth (%) 14.0% -2.9% -2.1% -1.3% -1.0% -0.6% 0.1% 0.8%
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Avg Sell Price 92.79 87.53 87.48 91.42 95.38 99.35 103.32 107.46 111.76




6.1.2. Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) 
There were two factors that helped determine what would be COGS for future periods. The first 
one was the fact that the percentage of Cost of Goods Sold in the total Revenue has been 
remarkably stable for every year of the historical period of 2016-2018. In that period, the ratio 
COGS/Revenue has ranged between 51.2% and 51.4%. The second one is related to Pirelli’s 
already high cost-efficiency compared to its peers, being the benchmark in this department with 
75% of its production done in low-cost countries taking advantage of the lower raw material 
costs of those locations, meaning that there is not much room to improve in this department.   
Considering the two factors explained above, COGS were estimated as a percentage of Revenue 
of the year and that percentage will be an average of the historical period’s COGS/Revenue 
ratio, which is 51.3%.  
 
6.1.3. Operational Expenses (OPEX) 
Operational Expenses are divided in two main categories: Personnel and Other Operational 
Expenses.  
6.1.3.1. Personnel Expenses 
Pirelli has historically been an extremely volatile company when it comes to Personnel 
expenses. There are two main components that constitute any Personnel expense, which are 
number of employees and average cost per employee. 
The increases in the number of employees was estimated by doing an average of the increases 
in the past years considered. Throughout the historical period chosen to support this valuation 
Pirelli’s employee number increased every year, and it would be expected that personnel costs 
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Revenues 4976 5352 5195 5313 5451 5612 5799 6037 6331
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
COGS -2546.90 -2751.10 -2665.30 -2725.28 -2796.35 -2878.97 -2974.85 -3096.75 -3247.54
% of revenues 51.2% 51.4% 51.3% 51.3% 51.3% 51.3% 51.3% 51.3% 51.3%
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would increase as a result of new hires combined with inflation. However, despite seeing the 
expected effect in 2017, in 2018 the overall Staff cost decreased. Historically the same situation 
has happened before. As a consequence, it becomes complicated to forecast future Personnel 
Expenses. Nonetheless, it was decided that the best possible forecast for this part of the 
valuation would be to grow average cost per employee of each year at the average of the 




6.1.3.1. Other Operational Expenses  
Other OPEX includes expenses such as R&D and other unspecified costs. Again, these costs 
were calculated in percentage of revenues to understand if there were any patterns over the 
years of the historical period. Other OPEX ranged between 7.1% and 9.8% without any clear 
upward or downward trends. Thus, in the end, it was considered that the future Other 
Operational Expenses would be determined considering the three-year average Other 
OPEX/Revenue ratio of the historical period, which is 8.4%.  
 
6.1.4. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) 
Naturally, it makes sense to distinguish between capital expenditures done on Property Plant & 
Equipment (PPE) and capital Expenditures of Intangible Assets.  
6.1.4.1. Property Plant & Equipment CAPEX 
Through its website, as previously stated, Pirelli shares an outlook for 2019, which was used as 
a source of assumptions for the future. Therefore, PPE CAPEX for 2019 would be 367 million 
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Other OPEX 414.30 522.05 366.42 445.09 459.07 473.80 489.57 509.62 534.42
% of revenues 8.3% 9.8% 7.1% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4%
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Nr of Emplyees 29787 30189 31489 32340 33191 34042 34893 35744 36595
+/- 402 1300 851 851 851 851 851 851
Cost per Emplyee 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
growth (%) 3.5% -1.1% 1.2% 0.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4%
Personnel Expenses 986.30 1034.65 1067.58 1109.74 1139.72 1176.44 1210.13 1245.82 1280.92
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€, being around 11.5% of the total Property Plant & Equipment of that year. Having in 
consideration Pirelli’s own estimations I decided to consider the same percentage of PPE 
CAPEX over total PPE for the following periods PPE CAPEX calculations, as the rate 
computed in 2019 is already reflecting Pirelli’s most recent investment policies to be applied 
in the future. It is essencial to mention that PPE CAPEX is growing at a faster rate than the 




6.1.4.2. Intangible Assets CAPEX 
Contrary to PPE CAPEX, in which Pirelli has been investing at a good pace each year, Pirelli 
has been less prominent when it comes to Intangible Assets CAPEX. During the historical 
period, IA CAPEX as always been less than 0.5% of total Intangible Assets value, a rate inferior 
to the Intangible Assets depreciation rate. Subsequently, it was assumed that the same trend 
continues for the future periods of the forecast, and so, upcoming IA CAPEX will be computed 
based on the average of the historical period’s IA CAPEX/Intangible Assets rate, which is 
approximately 0.23%.  
 
This valuation considers that for 2019 total CAPEX is 380 million €, which is already 
confirmed by Pirelli as the actual CAPEX value for 2019.  
  
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Total CAPEX 372.18 489.35 463.44 380.11 389.04 396.87 404.01 409.36 413.28
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
IA CAPEX 8.72 18.97 11.64 13.11 12.81 12.52 12.81 12.71 12.68
% of IA 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
PPE CAPEX 363.47 470.38 451.80 367.00 376.24 384.35 391.20 396.65 400.60




6.1.5. Depreciation & Amortization  
 
 
In what is concerned with depreciation and amortization, it was assumed that Pirelli will 
continue depreciating and amortizing its assets at a similar pace. As expected, Pirelli 
differentiates between the depreciation of its fixed assets and amortization of its intangible 
assets, and so, it was followed the same approach in this valuation.  
6.1.5.1. Property Plant & Equipment Depreciation 
Referring to the historical period of 2016-2018, Pirelli’s depreciation rate of PPE has been 
constantly rising. This increase can be credited to the fact that Pirelli’s Capital Expenditures 
are made mostly on assets with higher depreciation rates such as vehicles, furniture and 
equipment. Meaning that the average depreciation of total intangible assets will also rise as a 
consequence. Bearing in mind this increasing tendency, to estimate future PPE depreciation it 
was considered the growth between 2017’s PPE depreciation rate and 2018’s PPE depreciation 
rate, and after that it was applied that growth rate to the projected period. Once calculations 
were made, the projected percentage at what PPE Depreciation will grow in the future is 3.4% 




6.1.5.2. Intangible Assets Amortization  
Again, just like PPE depreciation, IA Amortization has shown a clear upward and has proved 
to be steadily growing throughout the historical years. This is a natural tendency since Capital 
Expenditures are mainly done on Intangible Assets with higher amortization rates, increasing 
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Depreciation & Amortization 392.38 370.87 394.30 408.58 431.44 454.37 477.17 499.63 521.53
Depreciation 273.82 250.67 269.08 278.33 296.15 314.04 331.83 349.35 366.40
Amortization 118.55 120.20 125.22 130.25 135.30 140.33 145.34 150.28 155.14
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Gross Tangible Assets 3935.82 3587.71 3921.00 4288.00 4664.24 5048.59 5439.78 5836.44 6237.04
Accumulated Depreciation 379.18 607.42 828.10 1106.43 1402.58 1716.62 2048.45 2397.80 2764.19
Yearly Depreciaton 273.82 250.67 269.08 278.33 296.15 314.04 331.83 349.35 366.40
Average depreciation rate (%) 7.7% 8.4% 8.7% 9.0% 9.3% 9.6% 10.0% 10.3% 10.7%
growth (%) 9.2% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4%
30 
 
their value in the total IA composition. The same procedure applied to determine PPE 
depreciation was used to compute future amortization rates. As a result, Amortization will be 
growing at the same rate it grew in 2018, 6.2%, for the totality of the forecast period with 




6.1.6. Property Plant & Equipment  
After determining the Capital Expenditures as well done on PPE as well as the depreciation 
suffered, reaching an estimation of this asset category for the forecast period was possible. As 
stated in section 6.1.4.1. PPE CAPEX is going to be a stable 12.1% of total Fixed Asset value 
for the period 2019-2024, and that combined with the increasing rate of depreciation still allows 
for Property Plant & Equipment to grow in the forecast period, although at a decreasing rate. 





6.1.7. Intangible Assets  
As seen before in previous sections, IA Amortization will be growing at a stable rate combined 
with a lower and fixed IA Capital Expenditure value throughout the estimated period will result 
in a decreasing value of Intangible Assets. This is in line with the evolution of past years 
Intangible Assets and as there are no announced plans to change the way this kind of Assets 




2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Gross intangible Assets n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Accumulated amortization n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Yearly amortization 118.55 120.20 125.22 130.25 135.30 140.33 145.34 150.28 155.14
Average depreciation rate (%) 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 3.1%
growth (%) 11.8% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2%
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
PPE 3556.64 2980.29 3092.90 3181.57 3261.66 3331.97 3391.34 3438.64 3472.84
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Intangible Assets 6496.89 5893.70 5783.34 5666.20 5543.71 5415.90 5283.37 5145.79 5003.34
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6.1.8. Working Capital  
Changes in Net Working Capital takes part in the FCFF calculations and therefore, it is 
necessary also to estimate how the constituents of the NWC are expected to evolve in the 
forecast period. Working Capital includes Account Receivables, Inventories, Account 
Payables, Income Tax Receivables/Payables and Other Current Assets/Liabilities.  
6.1.8.1. Account Receivables  
Account Receivables contribute positively to Net Working Capital and represent an Asset to 
Pirelli in the form of payments still to be received for products sold. To estimate this component 
of the Net Working Capital, it was determined the Days Sale Outstanding (DSO) at the end of 
each historical year (2016-2018). By computing historical DSO, it was possible to see that 
Pirelli has been able to reduce the number of payments to receive at the end of each year. Having 
that in consideration I calculated DSO for the forecast period at the decreasing rate registered 
from 2017 to 2018. Moreover, having forecasted DSO with simple mathematics, it was possible 
to obtain Accounts Payable for the entire forecast period. In the end, forecast DSOs range from 




6.1.8.2. Inventories  
Regarding Inventories, a similar methodology to the one used to forecast Account Receivables 
was used to estimate future Inventory values. Days of Inventory on Hand (DHI) were calculated 
for the historical years and studied to see if there were any particular patterns. Indeed, there 
were similarities in 2016 and 2018, while 2017 was an outlier year where DIH were extremely 
low. Thus, it was decided that the most accurate way of estimating Inventories for future periods 
was to consider 2018 DIH as the reference value for the remainder of the forecast period, as the 
most recent should be what is closest to future plans of the company regarding this matter. It is 
crucial to mention that 2016 and 2018 DIH are incredibly similar. In the end, it is assumed that 
DIH are 154.5 days for years 2019-2024, resulting in an increasing inventory value since DIH 
is calculated based on COGS which increase during the mentioned period.  
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Accounts Receivables 679.32 652.49 627.97 636.91 651.44 666.74 683.18 705.23 733.38
DSO 50 44 44 44 43 43 43 42 42






6.1.8.3. Account Payables 
Again, to estimate how Account Payables will be moving forward, Days Payable Outstanding 
were determined for the years 2016-2018. These showed a clear growing pattern meaning that 
Pirelli is taking more time to pay back its current obligations. Having this growth pattern into 
account, DPOs for the forecast periods were computed based on an increasing rate of 0.76%, 
the same rate at which DPO increased from 2017 to 2018, resulting in DPOs ranging from 144 
days in 2017 to 149.5 days in 2024. By combining increasing DPOs with increasing current 





6.1.8.4. Tax Receivables/Payables  
In Pirelli’s specific case, Tax Receivables/Payables are one of the most delicate subjects, as a 
consequence of the recent restructuring and re-entry in the stock exchange, recent years 
showcased a differential between tax receivables and tax payables that is not consistent with 
what it would be during the regular operation of Pirelli. In 2016, before Pirelli re-entered the 
exchange markets, Tax Receivables/Payments account was positive, mostly due to having 
higher tax receivables from income tax repayments from the government, as a result of past bad 
financial years, and also low tax payables from VAT received from customers. In 2017 and 
2018 as Pirelli’s operations accelerated again to better financial results, Tax 
Receivables/Payments account returned to normal negative values, which means that there is 
no longer tax money to be received at the end of each year, but instead tax money to be delivered 
to the government bodies.  
Bearing in mind what was just explained, it will be considered the percentage of Tax 
Payables/Payments over EBITDA of 2018 to determine following periods Tax 
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Inventories 1055.64 940.67 1128.00 1153.39 1189.62 1227.80 1268.65 1320.61 1384.88
DIH 151 125 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Accounts Payables -1498.49 -1673.64 -1604.68 -1688.12 -1755.44 -1827.01 -1902.09 -1991.05 -2095.08
DPO 139 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149
growth (%) 2.3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
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Payables/Payments. Ultimately, leading to an increasingly negative account as time advances 
in the projected period.  
The explanation given in this section leads to a constant ratio of Tax 
Payables/Payments/EBITDA of -2.2% and an account fluctuating between -24 million € in 




6.1.8.5. Other Current Assets/Liabilities 
Other Current Assets/Liabilities mostly consist of current financial instruments, such as 
derivatives, in the form of asset and liability, or securities available for trading. As investing on 
financial assets is not a core activity of Pirelli, there is not much detail regarding this type of 
current assets/liabilities, but still, it is worth it to consider in this valuation as it is a significant 
asset in terms of value for Pirelli.  
As time progressed in the historical period, the Other Current Assets/Liabilities account went 
from very negative, meaning that there these instruments globally went from representing 
mostly liabilities for Pirelli to being assets of the company. Hence, it was determined in the 
forecast period that the ratio Other Current Assets/Liabilities/Revenues would be the same as 
in 2018. This was considered to be an accurate assumption as it is expected that in the 
foreseeable future that financial instruments represent assets for companies and not liabilities.  
As a result, with an increase in Revenues and a stable and positive Other Current 
Assets/Liabilities/Revenues, this account is projected to range between 42 million € in 2019 
and 50 million € in 2024.  
 
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Tax receivables/payables 12.23 -12.96 -24.11 -22.73 -23.30 -23.92 -24.84 -26.17 -28.00
% of EBITDA 1.2% -1.2% -2.2% -2.2% -2.2% -2.2% -2.2% -2.2% -2.2%
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Other Current Assets/Liabilities -579.18 -201.23 -58.48 41.51 42.59 43.85 45.31 47.17 49.46
% of revenue -11.6% -3.8% -1.1% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
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6.2. Discounted Cash Flow 
After establishing the business plan for the next years, it was time to perform Pirelli’s equity 
valuation. The first method to be applied was the Discounted Cash Flow model, where the 
FCFF formula, showcased in the Literature Review section, was applied. Additionally, and 
explained in section 2.2.3., the WACC determined as the discount rate was computed based 
on the CAPM model. This section’s inputs will be based on what was previously explained in 
section 2 – Literature Review.  
6.2.1. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
The weighted average cost of debt is one of the most significant elements of every DCF 
valuation, as it is the rate at what future Cash Flows will be discounted. In the following 
sections, the three composing elements of the WACC formula estimations will be explained, 
based on what was previously presented in the Literature Review section.  
6.2.1.1. Cost of Equity  
According to what was presented in section 2, CAPM requires three inputs to be computed: 
Market Risk Premium (MRP), Risk-free Rate and Beta. Additionally, it was considered a third 
element, Country Risk Premium (MRP), so that the country risk of where Pirelli operates was 
taken into account.  
To estimate the risk-free rate to be applied, it was decided to use a 10yr German Government 
Bond with a yield of -0.298% on 5th of December of 2019. A German Government Bond 
utilized since it is denominated in euros, which is the currency in which Pirelli presents its 
financial results and the currency of this valuation, and also because it is commonly used as the 
risk-free rate benchmark to use in Valuations.    
Concerning the Market Risk Premium input, the Damodaran’s dataset was used to extract the 
necessary risk premiums of the regions in which Pirelli sells its products. After that, it was 
performed a weighted average considering the weight of the different regions in the total 
revenue of Pirelli, as demonstrated in the table below. After computations, the MRP to be 
applied was 9.12%.  
Regarding Beta calculations, Beta was calculated by performing a regression between last two 
years of Pirelli’s weekly stock returns and last two years of the market weekly index returns. 
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Two years for the time frame of past returns was chosen as Pirelli returned to the stock market 
in October 2017, which only allowed to have two years of relevant stock market activity. 
Additionally, weekly returns were extracted since it is the time frame best appropriate to regress 
two years of returns of two equity instruments.  
After that, it was run a regression between the two years weekly Returns of both Pirelli and the 
FTSE MIB index, returning a beta of approximately 1,07.  
Finally, once all three inputs were calculated, the CAPM formula was put to use, reaching the 












6.2.1.2. Cost of Debt 
Pirelli’s cost of debt was computed based on Pirelli’s risk spread. According to NYU Stern, the 
appropriate risk spread of a company is estimated considering its Interest Coverage Ratio, 
which is calculated by dividing the EBIT of a Company over its Interest Payment. For Pirelli, 
the estimated ICR for 2019 is around 2,98, which yields a Company Specific risk spread, 
according to NYU Stern risk spread for Large Manufacturing Firms table, of 2%. After 
extracting Pirelli’s risk spread, it was added the risk-free rate of -0,298, resulting in a cost of 
debt of roughly 1,7%.  
 This method for calculating Pirelli’s cost of debt was chosen as most of Pirelli’s debt financing 
is done in through bank loans, and not publicly traded debt.  
6.2.1.3. Statutory Tax Rate 
The Statutory Tax Rate allows having into consideration the effect of tax shields in the discount 





Market Risk Premium 9.12%




theoretical tax burden of the countries where Pirelli’s principal companies operate. Next, the 
share of taxes paid by geographical area, presented in the 2018 annual report, enabled to 
calculate the theoretical tax rate that Pirelli would pay. This is the correct tax rate to be applied 
in the WACC formula as many times the effective tax rate paid by companies is not an accurate 






In the end, the tax rate to apply in the WACC formula is Pirelli’s theoretical 24.34% tax rate, 
and it will be assumed that it will remain stable for the future.  
Now that all the necessary elements of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital are estimated, it 
is possible to determine what will be the discount rate to be used in the DCF valuation of Pirelli. 
As revealed in section 2, the WACC formula uses the capital structure of companies to 
determine the weight of each way of financing the company utilizes. Consequently, the Debt/EV 
and Equity/EV were computed. As for the Debt value of Pirelli, it was removed from the 
financial statements of the company, since the amortized debt value contained in the report 
should be a close to the actual value since it is mostly composed of bank loans. Moreover, the 
equity considered is at market value, computed by considering the number of shares outstanding 
and the share price on the 29th November of 2019. Ultimately, it was reached a Debt/EV of 
47.89% and an Equity/EV of 52.11%, which is consistent with what is presented by most 
financial databases.  
Once the Pirelli’s capital structure was determined, and with all the necessary inputs estimated, 
the last step of the WACC calculation process was to plug in the inputs in the WACC formula. 
In the end, the WACC after-tax estimated to be used in the valuation is 7.33%.  
 





Russia & MEAI 20.00% 5%
Combined Tax Rate 24.34%
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The input variables to reach the Free Cash Flow, were explained in the both this section and the 
previous. Additionally, to compute the FCFF it was multiplied (1-tax rate) by the EBIT and 
then added Depreciations & Amortizations. Then, CAPEX and changes in Net Working Capital 
were deducted. Finally, 1/(1+WACC) to the power of each corresponding year was used as a 
discount rate for the Cash Flows.  
6.2.3. Terminal Value (TV) 
To determine the terminal value, it was used the last estimated year, 2024, as a basis to estimate 
the perpetual Cash Flow. Firstly, Revenues were increased at the perpetuity growth rate, and as 
most of the other elements of the cash flow are estimated as percentages of revenue, they also 
grew at the perpetuity rate. The only element of the FCFF that suffered relevant changes 
compared to what was done for the projection period’s Cash Flows was CAPEX, as it is 
considered that in perpetuity CAPEX will cover depreciation while also growing at the 
perpetuity rate.  
Regarding the rate at which the company is expected to grow in perpetuity, it was decided to 
use the long-term world GDP growth of 2.47%, according to OECD estimates, as a proxy for 
the Pirelli’s perpetual growth. Considering that Pirelli sells its products worldwide, it made 
sense to consider a broader and less optimist perpetuity rate, as it is impossible for a firm to 
keep growing at the rate at it is currently growing or at the growth rate of the industry in which 
it operates.  
 
2016H 2017H 2018H 2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
FCFF 501.79 355.38 97.80 448.42 532.67 553.20 580.78 623.93 684.99
growth (%) -29.2% -72.5% 358.5% 18.8% 3.9% 5.0% 7.4% 9.8%
 
2019F 2020P 2021P 2022P 2023P 2024P
Discounted Cash Flow 448.42 496.31 480.26 469.79 470.25 7787.76
growth (%) 10.7% -3.2% -2.2% 0.1% 1556.1%
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6.2.4. Conclusion  
With all the projected period Cash Flows and Terminal Value computed, the only thing left to 
do was to sum them to reach the Enterprise Value. This valuation retrieved an Enterprise Value 
of €9,704 million for Pirelli. After determining the Enterprise Value, it was now possible to 
reach the Equity Value and consequently the share price of Pirelli by considering the effect of 
Net Debt, Other Assets and Liabilities and Income attributable minority interest.  
Regarding Net Debt, it was assumed that the Borrowings amount would remain constant for 
2019 since there is no indication that it will change in the foreseeable future. Cash was estimated 
based on a percentage of Revenues, being applied the percentage of 2018. Moving on, all 
components of Other Assets and Liabilities were estimated for 2019 by following the same 
evolution pattern of the historical period. It is vital to mention that Financial Assets are a 
significant component of Other Assets, and these have been taking part in the balance sheets of 
companies in a number of sectors more often than in previous years, as they are nowadays a 
relatively safe investment and good to help diversify forms of income. Last but not least, Net 
Income attributable to minority interest was projected for 2019, as a percentage of EBIT, 
applying the same ratio of 2018. The tables above help understand better the calculations made 
to estimate all components necessary to reach Equity Value.  
In the end, this valuation retrieved an Equity Value of €5,285 million, and as Pirelli is divided 
into a vast number of shares, 1 billion, the price per share projected by this DCF valuation for 










EV / EBITDA 8,86x
(+/-) Net Cash / Net Debt -3,205
(+/-) Other assets and liabilities -1,206
(-) Minorities -9
Equity Value @ 31 Dec 2019 5,285
Number of shares (in million) 1,000
Price per Share 5.28
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6.3. Relative Valuation 
 
6.3.1. Peer Selection  
Pirelli, like most companies, divides its peers into three levels of tiers, with peers belonging to 
tier 1 having characteristics more similar to Pirelli and more direct competitors, and peers with 
different characteristics belonging to tier 3. Also, Pirelli considers all tyre manufacturers that 
produce tyres dedicated to cars or motorcycles as peer companies.  
According to Pirelli’s own analysis, tier 1 is composed of five different competitors: Nokian 
Tyres Plc, Bridgestone Corp, Michelin Sca, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, and Continental Ag. 
Additionally, Pirelli divides tier 1 into two different groups.  
The first one is composed solely by Nokian, as this is the only tyre manufacturer with a similar 
EBITDA margin compared to Pirelli, which is superior to 18%. The second group is composed 
by the remaining four tyre producers, as all have similar EBITDA margins of around 11%. 
Nokian, despite having similar EBITDA margins, has a business model distinct from Pirelli, as 
it focuses its tyre production on mostly winter tyres while Pirelli focuses on the High-Value 
segment. Still, compared to Pirelli, Nokian is more of a Regional Company, with 60% of its 
sales coming from Nordic countries and Russia. Also, it allocates a much smaller amount of its 
Revenues to R&D compared to Pirelli, with Pirelli allocating 4.1% in 2018 and Nokian just 
1.3%. In terms of similarities, both companies’ production is done mostly on “low-cost” 
countries, and both sell their products through a solo brand.  
The other companies that compose tier 1 are all “Full-Liners” with a tyre offering for all market 
segments, having multiple tyre brands apart from the brand that goes by the name of the 
corporation. Additionally, these tier 1 peers allocate a smaller portion of its Revenues to R&D 
compared to Pirelli and are less consumer-focused than Pirelli and have most of its production 
being done on “high-cost” locations. Regarding resemblances, just like Pirelli, the Replacement 
segment is responsible for around 75% of the “Full-Liners” sales and revenues are distributed 
worldwide.  
Combined, the five tyre manufacturers that are part of tier 1 plus Pirelli were responsible for 
49% of all sales in 2018.  
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Next, tier 2 is composed of 14 different tyre producers, with the most notorious being the Asian 
Hankook Tire & Technology Co Ltd and Yokohama Rubber Co Ltd. Companies belonging to 
tier 2 are considered as “Mass Market” and have, on average, EBITDA margins of around 10%. 
Finally, tier 3 is composed by more than 150 tyre producing players and are companies 
specialized in the “Low Cost” segment, as a consequence of their market positioning, EBITDA 
margins of these producers are lower, ranging between 7% and 9%.  
As it is evident by the presentation of Pirelli’s peer companies above, Pirelli differs from the 
rest by having a unique business model resulting in a weak peer group, which consequently 
hurts any Relative Valuation performed on Pirelli.  
Having in consideration the tier description done above, it was decided to exclude companies 
that belong to tier 2 and tier 3 and just consider the companies that belong to tier 1 to perform 
the Relative Valuation of Pirelli, as tyre producers in tier 2 and 3 have financial ratios and 
business models quite different from Pirelli and including these dissimilar companies would 
not retrieve a fair Relative Valuation of Pirelli.  
 
6.3.2. Multiple Valuation  
After determining the peer group, the following step was to decide which multiples would be 
more appropriate for valuing Pirelli. First of all, it was determined to use forward multiples 
since those are considered by many as a better tool to use in a Relative Valuation. After that, 
the first multiple chosen was the P/E multiple, as it is the most commonly used multiple, 
yielding quality results when applied to a relatively stable firm. Also, this multiple is considered 
to be easy to understand by most. In addition, as the capital structure of Pirelli is not expected 
 
Mkt Cap Revenues Revenues Growth ROIC Gross Margin
Peers Europe RoW in €billion in €million CAGR(2014-2018)
Sub-tier 1 
NOKIAN TYRES 66.8% 33.2% 3.32 1,596 3.5% 18.7% 45.8%
Sub-tier 2
MICHELIN 38.9% 61.1% 18.99 22,028 3.0% 7.8% 32.3%
CONTINENTAL 48.3% 51.7% 23.48 44,404 6.5% 12.6% 25.0%
Sub-tier 3
GOODYEAR 43,3%1 56.7% 3.29 13,120 -1.0% 6.0% 22.7%
BRIDGESTONE 17.6% 82.4% 25.71 28,022 1.7% 10.2% 37.8%




to change dramatically, the results yielded by this multiple should be reliable. Two other 
multiples used were enterprise value multiples: EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales. EV/EBITDA 
multiple is regarded as a good multiple to use as EBITDA is the closest accounting figure to 
the actual operating Cash Flows generated by a company, as items such as depreciation, 
amortization, interest and taxes are not related to a company’s cost of operating its business. 
Additionally, EV multiples allow comparing companies with different capital structures, which 
is convenient for this analysis, as peer companies differ in that aspect from Pirelli.  Lastly, the 
EV/Sales multiple was used, as revenues is a hard accounting figure to manipulate by managers 
unlike earnings. Besides, this multiple is not as volatile when compared to other earnings 

















Multiple From The Peers Sample 11.01 6.32 1.15
Pirelli's Financial Indicators 0.44 1032.67 5312.79
Enterprise Value - Multiple Valuation 9263.28 6528.57 6120.33
(+/-) Net Cash / Net Debt 3205.09 3205.09 3205.09
(+/-) Other Assets and Liabilities 1205.77 1205.77 1205.77
(-) Minorities 8.90 8.90 8.90
Equity Value - Multiple Valuation 4843.52 2108.81 1700.57
Share Price - Multiple Valuation 4.84 2.11 1.70
 
Peers Price/Earnings EV/EBITDA EV/Sales
Sub-tier 1 
NOKIAN TYRES 10.41 8.79 2.39
Sub-tier 2
MICHELIN 10.45 5.44 1.04
CONTINENTAL 11.43 5.32 0.67
Sub-tier 3
GOODYEAR 11.52 5.84 0.65
BRIDGESTONE 11.23 6.22 1.01
Average 11.01 6.32 1.15
Median 11.23 5.84 1.01
Minimum 10.41 5.32 0.65
Maximum 11.52 8.79 2.39
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As it is made clear by the tables above, all the multiples chosen undervalue Pirelli by a large 
margin compared to the DCF valuation performed and also compared to Pirelli’s current stock 
price. More specifically, only the P/E multiple enabled to reach a value somewhat close to 
what was computed in the DCF valuation, while the values for Pirelli retrieved by applying 
the EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales multiples were very distant from the DCF valuation.  
This was expected, as even Pirelli’s closest competitors, which were chosen to form the peer 
group for this Relative Valuation, widely differ in terms of EBITDA margin and business 
model.  
To conclude, considering what was said above, the results reached by the Relative Valuation 
approach will be disregarded, and considered only the result provided by the DCF valuation 
method.  
6.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
An Equity Valuation requires the use of assumptions in order to apply valuation models. 
Knowing that in most cases assumptions might not entirely reflect reality, it is a good practice 
to understand how changes in the different inputs used to construct, in this case, a DCF 
valuation model, might affect the result generated. To quantify the changes, two sensitivity 
analysis were performed. The first one assesses the effect of a change in the WACC and 
terminal growth used to discount the FCFF and TV obtained in the DCF valuation. The second 
one considers fluctuations in the main Revenue drivers, Product & Mix and Price & Mix. 
Regarding the first, the variations of the WACC are caused by a variation in Pirelli’s Beta, since 
the cost of equity is the highest contributor to the overall WACC, as a consequence of today’s 
healthy economy allowing for low debt cost. Additionally, Beta fluctuations, which can happen 
more frequently than changes in other WACC variables, have a tremendous impact in the 
WACC. In just 2018 alone, according to the Thomson Reuters Eikon software, the beta varied 
from 0.72 to 1.29, which demonstrates the volatility of this input and why it is relevant to 








The Figure above showcases how fluctuations in the WACC, and terminal growth rate influence 
the stock price generated by the DCF valuation of Pirelli. The row of numbers above the WACC 
refers to the Betas used to retrieve the WACC below.  
It is made clear by this table that minor changes in either the WACC or perpetual growth rate 
have a meaningful impact on the share price of Pirelli, since it is very dependent of the Terminal 
Value, which is largely dependent on the two variables being tested.  
 
The tables above portray the effect of variations in the two main Revenue Drivers, Product & 
Mix and Price & Mix, on Pirelli’s stock price. The table to the left demonstrates that if the effect 
of the slowdown of the automotive industry on the evolution if units sold by 2022 is more than 
just a negative 1%, the share price goes down by a significant margin. The same can be said for 
Price & Mix Revenue driver, which is displayed on the table on the right. 
In conclusion, performing a sensitivity analysis to the most critical assumptions made to 
construct the DCF valuation enabled to understand that marginal changes to the assumptions 
made could significantly alter the share price of 5.28€ estimate for Pirelli by the end of the year.  
 
 
-1% -1.25% -1.5% -1.75%
Price per Share 5.28 4.69 4.39 4.12
Tyre Units Growth Decrease by 2022
-0.5% -0.75% -1.0% -1.25%
Price per Share 5.28 4.92 4.68 4.44
Price & Mix Growth Decrease by 2022
Wacc
0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2
6.41% 6.65% 6.88% 7.12% 7.21% 7.60% 7.83%
Growth 2.07% 6.58 6.03 5.53 5.08 4.73 4.30 3.96
2.27% 6.99 6.39 5.86 5.38 5.00 4.54 4.17
2.47% 7.44 6.79 6.21 5.69 5.28 4.79 4.41
2.67% 7.95 7.24 6.60 6.04 5.60 5.07 4.66









The table above shows the FCFF for the period 2019-2021 of this dissertation against the FCFF 
computed by Banca IMI’s equity research. The evolution of the FCFFs of both pieces of 
research occurs in a similar matter, with an increase from 2019 to 2020 and a decrease from 
2020 to 2021. Despite evolving in a similar matter, this dissertation considers a higher FCFF in 
2019, mainly due to assuming a lower CAPEX and DA expenses. One can consider this 
dissertation to be a little more realistic since it is based on more recent information, provided 
by Pirelli, about 2019’s financial performance. As for the following two years, both FCFFs 
estimated by Banca IMI are higher than the FCFFs estimated in this dissertation as Banca IMI 
believes that CAPEX and DA expenses will decrease with time, while this dissertation 
considers precisely the opposite. Interestingly, regarding Revenues, this dissertation is in line 
with what is projected by Banca IMI.  
A FCFF comparison for the projected years 2023 and 2024 cannot be done, as there are no 
FCFF estimations for those years. Usually, investment banks do not forecast periods far ahead 






The WACC computed in this dissertation is lower by 24 basis points in comparison to Banca 
IMI’s WACC estimation. The leading causes for this difference are the risk-free, market risk 
 
2019E 2020E 2021E
Dissertation 448 496 480
FCFF change (%) 10.7% -3.2%
Banca IMI 428 536 529
FCFF change (%) 25.2% -1.3%
 
Disseration Banca IMI
Risk Free Rate -0.30% 1.75%
Levered Beta 1.07 1.10
Risk Premium 9.12% 7.00%
Cost of Equity 12.49% 9.2%
Cost of Debt 1.70% 5.00%
D/EV 48% 38%
E/EV 52% 62%




premium, effective tax rate and long-term capital ratio. Banca IMI does not specify how they 
reached these WACC drivers, so it is not possible to compare this dissertation’s WACC 
components reasoning against Banca IMI’s. It is only possible to say that Banca IMI believes 
that Pirelli will unleveraged itself over time while this dissertation considers that it will keep 
constant. Banca IMI assumption regarding the long-term capital structure is reasonable, as the 
favourable interest rate environment should not last forever, and as a consequence, firms most 
likely will use less debt as a form of financing. On the other, Pirelli does not have any plans 
regarding the way it plans to finance itself in the future, and consequently, in this dissertation, 
it was chosen to go through the safest route by considering a permanent capital structure. 
Ultimately, both the cost of equity and cost of debt estimated in this dissertation differ from 





Finally, in terms of the final recommendation comparison, this dissertation advises that 
investors should buy Pirelli’s stock but having in mind that there is only a 2.5% upside when 
buying Pirelli’s stock, while Banca IMI’s advises buying based on a much higher upside.  
 
8. Conclusion  
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide investment advice regarding Pirelli & C 
Spa stock. Two valuation approaches were utilized in this dissertation, the first one being the 
Discounted Cash Flow model, being discounted at the WACC, and the second one being a 
Relative Valuation, through a multiples’ analysis. This dissertation provides investment advice 
based on a single method, the DCF model, as due to the distinctiveness of Pirelli’s business 
model and EBITDA margin was difficult to consider any of its competitors as suitable peers. 
Therefore, this led to a poor relative valuation, yielding stock prices for Pirelli ranging from 
  
Disseration Banca IMI
# Shares Outstanding 1,000 1,000
Enterprise Value 9704 9815
Value of Equity 5,285 6,223
Price per Share (29th November 2019) 5.15 5.41




€1.7 and €4.8, showing discrepancy. As a consequence, the Relative Valuation was not suitable 
for giving any investment advice or to serve as a comparison to the DCF valuation.  
To understand how any small variation to the most important assumptions made could affect 
the stock price, it was built a sensitivity analysis for the DCF approach. Additionally, it was 
important to see the effect on the stock price if the slowdown of the automotive industry proves 
to lower even more demand for tires.  
The fair value estimated for Pirelli’s share at the end of 2019 is €5.28. Given that Pirelli’s stock 
is trading at €5.15 as of 29th November 2019, and assuming that a firm’s stock price should 
reflect, at some point in the future, it’s fair value, the investment recommendation that this 
dissertation provides is that investors should hold Pirelli’s stock as the market is currently 
trading at a price very close to the fair value.  
Last but not least, it should be acknowledged that after a period of restructuring dropping its 
industrial tyre segment, Pirelli has shown resilience and a desire to serve its customers better 
than its competitors, being the only tyre producer dedicated to the HV segment. Management 
has demonstrated to be actively working on making Pirelli become more efficient in the future 
by divesting in the less profitable Standard segment and investing in the more profitable HV 
segment while investing in R&D to discover ways of cutting costs while maintaining Pirelli’s 
renowned high quality. This valuation does not incorporate the premium, consequent of Pirelli’s 
right management decisions and adequacy of its business model to industry drivers that most 
investment banks and researchers include in Pirelli’s share price. Nonetheless, it is predicted 
that massive competition should come from competitors such as Michelin and Continental, as 














9. Appendixes  
9.1. Car Parc Forecast  
According to Pirelli Car Parc, evolution is directly correlated with the demand for tyres, 
affecting, in the short run, the demand of the O.E. segment in the long run the Replacement 
segment demand. For the future, car production is expected to slow down, which directly 
reduces the number of tyres produced and sold by tyre manufacturers.  
As it is demonstrated in the tables above, the slower growth of the global car parc results in a 



















9.2. Pirelli’s SWOT Analysis 
Pirelli operates in a mature industry that has not endured any relevant changes for decades. The 
high barriers lifted by the experienced players hidden behind giant economies of scale, 
countless capital spilled on technology, and the lack of substitutes are strengths that characterize 
the industry. The global trend of emerging markets growth and infrastructures development, 
the electric cars and even safety regulations are opportunities on a reinsuring future for the 
 








2016H 2017H 2018H 2019P 2022P
Car Parc
Total 1,281 1,332 13,882 1,428 1,565
Premium & Prestige 133 141 149 157 182
48 
 
organizations. Due to a highly competitive industry environment, arising from low product 
diversification and significant exit barriers, profitability margins tend to be lower. Higher 
regulatory pressures and legal requirements derived from growing global environmental 
awareness can harm the current industry profitability. Moreover, the double effect of oil, both 
as a raw material input for synthetic rubber and as a critical driver for car usage, constitutes a 
threat to the industry. 
9.3. Porters Five Forces  
Competition within the Industry (High) 
This is an industry moderately concentrated, with top 5 market companies having a 
concentration ratio of roughly 50%. Low levels of product differentiation, within each segment, 
translates in competition on prices. 
Companies are now trying to gain an advantage over competitors by investing in other 
parameters such as performance, reputation and customer service. Decreasing operating 
margins due to the competitive environment and growing influence of low-cost Asian 
competitors means the industry profitability is dependent on input prices. 
Bargaining Power of Buyers (Moderate) 
Contractual agreements for Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM’s) influence positively 
the bargaining power of suppliers. Not only the price of tyres remains stable, irrespectively of 
market price, but also Original Equipment Manufacturers are able to negotiate prices due to 
their scale. 
Moreover, on the Replacement market, large retail chains are able to put pressure to lower 
prices when buying in larger quantities. However, dispersed small size buyers cannot achieve 
such bargaining power. 
Overall, buyers do not have viable substitute products to tyres, but low switching costs make it 





Bargaining Power of Suppliers (Moderate) 
The manufacturing and processing of both natural and synthetic rubber is dominated by a few 
large world players. Hence, the existence of cartels for natural rubber and petroleum such as 
OPEC translates in higher bargaining power of suppliers. 
Tyre production is highly sensitive to price fluctuations of rubber and other petroleum 
derivatives since it is dependent on large amounts of those raw materials. There is a correlation 
between oil prices and rubber prices (figure 23) and, as explained before, the increase in oil 
price increases syntactic rubber price. This will result in the utilization of higher percentages of 
natural rubber in tyre production which will ultimately lead to a natural rubber price increase. 
To mitigate the dependence on some providers of raw materials, some manufacturers started to 
perform backward integration, as in the case of Goodyear, where the company produces some 
percentage of its rubber needs. Accordingly, this leads to the moderate bargaining power of 
suppliers. 
Threat of New Entrants (Low) 
The industry has high barriers to entry. In general terms, most tyres are relatively 
undifferentiated, meaning that companies to be profitable, need to produce in large quantities 
to achieve economies of scale. High capital expenditures are required, so it is challenging for 
new entrants to match the scale of the existing producers. Furthermore, a substantial amount of 
R&D is required to develop and test new tyre models, whose approvals are difficult and costly 
to get due to strict legal and safety regulations. Brand recognition makes it difficult to enter the 
market with an unknown product, contributing to a low threat of new entrants. 
Threat of Substitutes Products (Low) 
There are no viable substitutes for tyres. However, it is necessary to take in consideration that 
a higher environmental awareness could lead individuals towards the usage of public 
transportation, which would affect the number of vehicle usage, leading to a corresponding 
decrease in demand for tyres. Counterfeit tyres small market share and low expectations of 
growth do not represent a significant threat to the industry. 
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9.4. Raw Materials  
According to Pirelli’s November Company Presentation, the main boosters of costs are natural 
rubber and synthetic rubber. Natural rubber is obtained through rubber trees, which requires 
warm climates. While synthetic rubber can be produced from petrochemical feedstock with 
crude oil and butadiene as the primary inputs. 
Accordingly, an increase in the oil price/butadiene leads to more costly synthetic rubber, which 
increases demand for natural rubber and makes it more expensive. 
When looking at 2018 numbers, variations were characterized by increases in the price of 
energy resources and butadiene (main raw material in synthetic rubber production) and a 
decrease in the price of natural rubber.  
Brent Oil 
Recorded an average price for the year of $72 per barrel, representing an increase in +31.0% 
compared to the average price in 2017. Despite that, oil price closed the year on a downfall with 
December averaging $58 per barrel. In the 1H2019, Brent prices averaged $64 per barrel and 
the U.S. Energy Information forecasts the price to be around $65 per barrel, maintaining a price 
range similar to the first half of the year. 
Butadiene 
Closed 2018 with an annual average of €1011/ton, which was a drop of 10% compared to the 
annual average price in 2017 (€1112/ton). The downward trend continued in the 1H2019 with 
butadiene prices reducing, and a similar behaviour is expected for the rest of the year. The 
commodity is forecasted to average close to €950/ton in 2019. 
Natural Rubber 
Prices are bouncing back after a sharp decline in 2018. The commodity closes the previous year 
averaging $1365 per ton, which represented a price fall of 20% relative to 2017YE, where 
Natural Rubber price was $1651/ton on average. Relative to the 1H2019, a recovery was felt, 
and the price is expected to average $1450 per ton in 2019. 
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Due to its unpredictability and prices dependent what deals Pirelli is able to negotiate with its 
suppliers, the effect of the projected raw material prices was not considered in this valuation, 
but those could have a profound impact in Pirelli’s valuation if any large price fluctuations were 
to happen in the future.  
9.5. Forex Impact  
As a significant part of Pirelli’s revenues are generated by sales in volatile emerging markets, 
Pirelli can have gains or losses related to forex exchange. For 2019, Pirelli has already 
confirmed in its November Company Presentation that in 2019 Forex will not have any impacts 
in the revenues of the firm. Considering the high unpredictability of foreign exchange 
fluctuations and lack of forecasts and research on this matter, it was decided to consider the 
2019 Forex impact for the remaining of the projected period (2020-2024). 
9.6. Market Risk Premium Calculations 
Since Pirelli’s sales come from all parts of the globe, it was not a good practice to consider just 
one Market Risk Premium (MRP) to be applied in the CAPM formula. Since there is no 
information regarding Revenue per country, it was just possible to apply the MRP of the six 
regions in which Pirelli sells its products and then apply a weighted average based on the weight 









Asia/Pacific (APAC) 17.14% 9.67%
Latin America 13.32% 11.08%
Middle East/Africa/India 3.99% 11.90%




9.7 Beta Calculations  
Beta is used to measure an asset’s risk compared to a benchmark. Determining the Beta of a 
company is a process that requires a number of decisions to be made.  
The first one concerns the choice of market index to use as a benchmark of the market portfolio. 
As it was said in a previous section, The Borsa Italiana was chosen as the market benchmark 
for Pirelli as Pirelli is an Italian Company traded in the Borsa Italiana.  
The second decision has to do with the return interval, which can be daily, weekly or monthly. 
According to Damodaran (1999), the best interval to use is monthly, as Betas estimated with 
shorter return intervals can have significant biases caused by non-trading issues.  
The third and last decision has to do with the period of analysis, which in Pirelli’s case, the 
third decision was limited to a maximum of two year period. The period limitation influences 
the choice of return interval, as applying a longer interval in just two years of financial data 
would return a beta based on a limited number of observations.  
In the end, Pirelli’s Beta was estimated by performing a regression on two years of weakly 
weekly returns of MIB and Pirelli, resulting in a sample of 104 returns for each security. Figure 
46 contains the regression run, which resulted in a beta of 1.07 
   








-6.00% -4.00% -2.00% 0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00%
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9.8. Interest Coverage Ratio and Cost of Debt Calculations 
Netflix’s cost of debt was computed as a function of the firm’s credit rating since there was no 
rating provided by a reliable Credit Rating Company it was necessary to calculate Pirelli’s 
Interest Coverage. After dividing Pirelli’s 2019 expected EBIT by 2019’s expected interest 
expense, resulting in an ICR of 2.98, it was determined that Pirelli has a rating equivalent to 
Ba2/BBB. On the table below can be seen that, for mature companies with a market cap superior 
to $5 billion in the Ba2/BBB rating bracket, the appropriate spread over the risk-free rate is 2%. 
As a result, Netflix’s cost of debt was assumed to be 1.7% (-0.298% (rf) + 2% (spread)). 
 
 
   
 
If interest coverage ratio is
> ≤ to Rating is Spread is
-100000 0.199999 D2/D 19.38%
0.2 0.649999 C2/C 14.54%
0.65 0.799999 Ca2/CC 11.08%
0.8 1.249999 Caa/CCC 9.00%
1.25 1.499999 B3/B- 6.60%
1.5 1.749999 B2/B 5.40%
1.75 1.999999 B1/B+ 4.50%
2 2.2499999 Ba2/BB 3.60%
2.25 2.49999 Ba1/BB+ 3.00%
2.5 2.999999 Baa2/BBB 2.00%
3 4.249999 A3/A- 1.56%
4.25 5.499999 A2/A 1.38%
5.5 6.499999 A1/A+ 1.25%
6.5 8.499999 Aa2/AA 1.00%
8.50 100000 Aaa/AAA 0.75%
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9.9 Financial Statements Forecast  
 
Figure 49: Income Statement 
 
 
Interest Expense for the Projection Period is determined by doing an average of the interest rate paid by Pirelli.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Sales and Services rendered 4,976 5,352 5,195 5,313 5,451 5,612 5,799 6,037 6,331
COGS (2,547) (2,751) (2,665) 2,725 2,796 2,879 2,975 3,097 3,248
Gross Margin 2,430 2,601 2,529 2,588 2,655 2,733 2,824 2,940 3,083
GM (%) 48.8% 48.6% 48.7% 48.7% 48.7% 48.7% 48.7% 48.7% 48.7%
Staff Costs (1,135) (1,205) (1,062) (1,110) (1,140) (1,176) (1,210) (1,246) (1,281)
Other OPEX (265) (351) (372) (445) (457) (470) (486) (506) (530)
EBITDA 1,029 1,045 1,095 1,033 1,059 1,087 1,128 1,189 1,272
Ebitda (%) 20.7% 19.5% 21.1% 19.4% 19.4% 19.4% 19.5% 19.7% 20.1%
Depreciation and amortization (342) (371) (394) (409) (431) (454) (477) (500) (522)
EBIT 687 674 701 624 627 632 651 689 751
Interest income 43 17 17 17 17 18 18 19 20
% Financial Assets 12% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Interest expense (470) (357) (197) (209) (209) (209) (209) (209) (209)
% Gross Debt 7% 8% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Others (20) (30) (19) (18) (18) (19) (19) (20) (22)
% EBITDA 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
EBT 239 304 502 414 417 422 441 478 539
Taxes (75) (41) (53) (44) (44) (45) (47) (50) (57)
Effective Tax Rate (%) 31% 13% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Extra Items (16) (88) (6) (5) (5) (5) (6) (6) (7)
% EBT 7% 29% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Net income 148 176 442 365 367 372 389 421 475
Attributable to non-controlling interests (13) 1 (11) (9) (9) (9) (9) (10) (12)
% Net Income 9% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Net income to common shareholders 135 176 432 356 358 363 379 411 464
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Figure 50: Balance Sheet (Assets) 
 
Investment in associates and Joint Ventures is mainly influenced by Xushen Tyre (Shangai) Co.’s, a subsidiary of Pirelli, ramp up phase, which 
will end in 2020, so the investment will be the same in 2019 and 2020 and from 2021 and after it will return to  normal 2017 values. 
 
Assets held for sale represent in the Historical Period a Chinese plant, which was sold in the beginning of 2019 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Current assets
Cash and Short Term Investments 1,533 1,118 1,327 1,368 1,404 1,445 1,493 1,554 1,630
Total Receivables 989 1,052 1,053 1,015 1,036 1,061 1,090 1,130 1,180
Trade Receivables 679 652 628 637 648 662 678 700 728
Other Receivables 246 364 384 339 348 358 370 385 404
Financial Receivables 30 37 33 34 35 36 37 38 40
Tax Receivables 64 35 41 39 40 41 43 45 48
Total Inventory 1,056 941 1,128 1,153 1,183 1,218 1,259 1,311 1,374
Other current assets 73 61 126 129 132 136 140 146 153
Derivative Financial Instruments 24 28 99 101 103 106 110 115 120
Other Financial Assets at FVTIS - - 27 28 29 29 30 32 33
Securities held for trading 49 33 - - - - - - -
3,651 3,172 3,634 3,665 3,755 3,860 3,983 4,141 4,337
Non current assets
Property, plant and equipment 3,557 2,980 3,093 3,182 3,262 3,332 3,391 3,439 3,473
Intangible assets 6,497 5,894 5,783 5,666 5,544 5,416 5,283 5,146 5,003
Investments in associates and J.V. 47 17 73 74 76 18 19 20 21
Other financial assets 199 230 - - - - - - -
Other financial assets at fair value through other comprehensive income - - 69 70 72 74 77 80 84
Other financial assets at fair value through income statement - - - - - - - - -
Deferred tax assets 148 112 74 70 72 74 76 80 86
Other receivables 131 109 103 118 121 125 129 134 141
Financial Receivables 96 95 124 108 110 114 118 122 128
Tax receivables 12 27 16 15 16 16 17 18 19
Derivative financial instruments 1 20 21 21 22 22 23 25
10,686 9,465 9,355 9,324 9,294 9,190 9,132 9,062 8,979
Assets Held for Sale 61 11 - - - - - -









Figure 52: Balance Sheet (Equity) 
 
  
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Financial Assets 367 386 339 327 336 346 357 372 390
Derivative Financial Instruments 24 28 99 101 103 106 110 115 120
Other Financial Assets at FVTIS - - 27 28 29 29 30 32 33
Securities held for trading 49 33 - - - - - - -
Other financial assets 199 230 - - - - - - -
Other financial assets at fair value through other comprehensive income - - 69 70 72 74 77 80 84
Financial Receivables 96 95 124 108 110 114 118 122 128
Derivative financial instruments - 1 20 21 21 22 22 23 25
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Equity
Share capital 1,342 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904
Reserves 1,785 2,097 2,204 2,019 1,963 1,824 1,717 1,574 1,388
Net Income 148 176 442 365 367 372 389 421 475
Total Equity 3,275 4,177 4,551 4,288 4,234 4,100 4,010 3,900 3,768
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The Balance Sheet item called Provisions for Liabilities and charges is composed mainly by labor disputes and as such it was projected as a 
percentage of staff costs, applying 2018’s ratio (13%) for the totality of the Projection Period.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Non current l iabi l i ties
Borrowings from banks and other financial institutions 5,946 3,897 3,929 3,929 3,929 3,929 3,929 3,929 3,929
Other payables 87 74 83 84 83 88 90 94 99
% Revenues 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Provisions for liabilities and charges 171 127 138 143 147 151 156 160 165
% Staff Costs 15% 11% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
Provisions for deferred tax liabilities 1,452 1,217 1,082 1,020 1,045 1,073 1,114 1,174 1,256
% Differed Tax Assets 981% 1091% 1459% 1459% 1459% 1459% 1459% 1459% 1459%
Employee benefit obligations 368 274 224 234 241 248 256 263 271
% Staff Costs 32% 23% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21%
Tax payables 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
% EBITDA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Derivative financial instruments - 55 16 16 17 17 18 19 20
% Revenues 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
8,028 5,647 5,475 5,429 5,464 5,510 5,565 5,641 5,742
Current l iabi l i ties
Borrowings from banks and other financial institutions 642 559 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Trade payables 1,498 1,674 1,605 1,688 1,746 1,812 1,884 1,971 2,072
Other payables 783 565 437 615 631 649 671 698 732
% Revenues 16% 11% 8% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Provisions for liabilities and charges 46 46 34 41 42 43 45 46 47
% Staff Costs 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Employee benefit obligations 42 - 5 6 6 6 6 6 7
% Staff Costs 4% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Tax payables 52 48 66 62 63 65 67 71 76
% EBITDA 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Derivative financial instruments - 18 60 61 63 64 67 69 73
% Revenues 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
3,064 2,910 3,006 3,272 3,350 3,440 3,540 3,662 3,807
Total Liabi l i ties 11,092 8,557 8,481 8,701 8,814 8,950 9,106 9,303 9,548
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